subject to sunset review' and approximately six hundred bills affecting hospitals were filed. 2 Of those filed, some 150 were enacted, most becoming effective on September 1, 1993. 3 Although the purpose of the Survey is to identify developments that have arisen in Texas, some of the following discussion will include matters that emanate from federal law, regulation, and Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit cases that relate to Texas. For purposes of this initial article, health care law issues will cover the period between August 30, 1993 and December 31, 1994. This review period has been extended back to include 1993 legislation and forward a few months to include significant recent developments.
The scope of "health care law" is not a precise body of law but is best defined by the issues affecting the various participants in the field. In a general sense, participants do one of the following: provide care, receive care, pay for care, or regulate payors or providers of care. Even though tort claims are related to patient care, this Article will not deal with issues involving medical malpractice or products liability except to the extent that a related issue affects the operation or mode of business of the particular participant.
Organizationally, this Article will discuss matters on a subject issue basis since one or more participants may be involved in any particular subject issue. Where a subject area has substantial recent legislative change, the subject area will be separated into case law and legislative/regulatory change.
I. DEVELOPMENTS INVOLVING AIDS

A. RIGHTS RELATED TO HIV-INFECTED HEALTHCARE WORKERS
The right to reassign a healthcare worker with a communicable disease was upheld in Bradley v. University of Texas M.D. Anderson Cancer Center. 4 The HIV-infected worker who served as a surgical assistant involved in invasive procedures was reassigned to a position that did not involve patient care. The worker objected to the reassignment and filed suit, claiming discrimination.
The Fifth Circuit, in hearing the worker's appeal, applied the Rehabilitation Act of 19735 to determine whether he was "otherwise qualified" to perform the functions of a surgical assistant in spite of his HIV infection.
TEX. Gov'T CODE ANN. § § 325.001-325.024 (Vernon 1988 & Supp. 1995).
Sunset review is a process required by the legislature to review the necessity of the particular agency and whether its purposes and methodologies should be modified or whether the agency should be consolidated with another or abolished. In arriving at its support for the reassignment, the court made the following observations and findings: 1. Although infected blood could transmit the disease from the worker to the patient, it was too speculative to determine the probability of such a transmission; 2. even though the probability was uncertain, the risk was not so low considering the seriousness of a resultant infection; and 3. since the risk of even a low probability transmission could be disastrous, the worker was not "otherwise qualified" as a surgical assistant. 4. There was no duty upon the hospital to find the worker another position because it could not make "reasonable accommodations" to reduce the risks associated with the "essential functions" required as a surgical assistant. 6 B. REFUSAL TO TREAT AIDs PATIENTS As a general rule, health care providers, including physicians and dentists, are free to decide which patients they wish to treat. This free choice is subject to limitations involving constitutionally prohibited discriminations if the provider participates in state or federal payment programs such as Medicare or Medicaid. In a recent case, United States v. Jack Castle, D.D.S., 7 the court held that patients who are HIV-infected are subject to the protections afforded by the Americans with Disabilities Act. This case involved the denial of treatment to a patient who had answered a questionnaire that he was HIV-positive. The case was settled by agreement with the Department of Justice; the terms involved payment of $80,000 compensatory damages and $20,000 in civil penalties, although there was no admission of violation of the ADA since Dr. Castle asserted that the staff that took the actions were not authorized by policy or procedure to do so.
II. ANTITRUST
A. LEGISLATION Amendments to the Health and Safety Code provide for the development of cooperative agreements among hospitals that allocate health care equipment, facilities, personnel, or services. 8 This legislation permits discussion and negotiation with respect to the cooperative agreement, but does not authorize the merger of facilities or discussion of price-fixing or predatory pricing.
A cooperative agreement requires that the parties to the agreement apply to the Texas Department of Health (TDH if seeking to obtain a 
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certificate of public advantage (certificate). 9 In the application to TDH for the certificate, TDH will evaluate the potential advantages and disadvantages of the proposed agreement to determine whether any of the following would occur:
A. Advantages' 0
1. Enhance quality of care, 2. preserve availability of services to a specific area, 3. increase cost efficiency of services, 4. improve utilization of hospital resources and equipment, and 5. avoid duplication of resources.
B. Disadvantages 1 '
1. Difficulty caused by a cooperative agreement which would interfere with or reduce the likelihood of health maintenance organizations, preferred provider organizations, or other payors of health services being able to contract with providers of health care, 2. any reduction in competition among providers of services or goods that compete with those involved in the cooperative agreement, 3. negative effects on the quality, availability, or price of services to patients, and 4. restrictions on the availability of arrangements that are competitive to the cooperative agreement. The process of review and determination by TDH may involve public hearings but must involve consultation with the Attorney General to assess anticompetitive effects. At any time before, during, or after the granting of a certificate, either TDH or the Attorney General may seek review and cancellation of the certificate if circumstances change such that the benefits of the agreement no longer outweigh the disadvantages of the arrangement.
B. REGULATIONS
Regulations adopted by the TDH amplified on the enabling legislation related to co-operative agreements (Agreement) between hospitals.' 2 The regulations clarified that only facilities licensed by TDH could submit co-operative agreements for review and approval.' 3 The application requirements were enumerated' 4 and also specified that the agreement was to be fully executed by all parties.' 5 9. Id § 313 .002(b). Id § 313 .002(e)(1)-(5).
10.
11.
Id. § 313.002(f)(1)-(4) (Vernon Supp. 1995).
12. 25 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 134 .101 (West 1995).
Id. § 134.101(b)(1)(A).
14. Id. § 134.101(b)(2).
Id. § 134.101(b)(1)(C).
Application requirements that were distinctive amplifications of the enabling legislation include the following: 16 1. An identification of the steps necessary for a potential competitor of the Agreement to enter into the relevant market; 2. a historical description of the business transactions of the parties to the Agreement that relate to the subject of the Agreement; 3. an explanation of the effects of the Agreement on each party including volume, price, and revenue; 4. a description of the market share of the parties to the Agreement and other providers of the same service before and as projected after implementation of the Agreement; and 5. an explanation of why efficiencies could not be achieved without implementation of the Agreement. In addition to the preceding requirements, TDH may deny an application if it determines that "there is not clear and convincing evidence that the likely benefits resulting from the agreement outweigh any disadvantages attributable to a reduction in competition .... -17
III. BUSINESS DEVELOPMENTS A. NON-COMPETITION AGREEMENTS
The 1993 legislative session modified the part of the Business and Commerce Code relating to covenants not to compete. 18 The revision allows a covenant not to compete to be part of an otherwise enforceable agreement without the payment of additional consideration. 19 If the agreement is found to contain unreasonable limitations as to time, geographic area, or scope of activity to be restrained a court may reform the agreement to appropriately protect the business interests of the person or entity benefitting from the covenant. 20 The revision also specifically is made applicable to agreements for a term or at will.
'
B. NON-PROFIT HEALTH CORPORATIONS
The label "Non-profit health corporation" (NPHC) is an industry coined term used for a type of "state" non-profit corporation that meets certain requirements of the Medical Practice Act (MPA) 22 and has been reviewed and certified by the Texas State Board of Medical Examiners (TSBME). 23 It is also frequently referred to as a "5.01(a)" corporation because its organizational documents and structure conform to specifications in section 5.01(a) of the MPA. Although this type of corporate structure has been authorized for many years, its utilization was minimal until recently. Much attention has been focused on this legal structure as a mechanism for the employment of physicians by a corporation which is otherwise prohibited by the MPA. 24 Except for this corporate form, the only other mechanism for employment of a physician is by another physician or by a professional association composed entirely of physicians.
This non-profit health corporation structure, in an indirect manner, allows a person or entity other than a physician to be involved in the employment of the physician. This is possible since the Texas Non-Profit Corporations Act 25 permits a state non-profit corporation to be organized either with or without "members. '26 The member of the typical NPHC is a corporate entity such as a hospital.
In the development of the NPHC's organizational and structural design, the member often reserves many powers including the right to appoint the board of directors or trustees (Board) of the corporation. To meet the requirements of 5.01(a) of the MPA, all of the Board directors or trustees must be physicians practicing full time and licensed by TSBME.
Because of concerns expressed by various associations that the current arrangements may allow a corporate entity to unduly influence an employed physician's exercise of independent medical judgment, the TSBME has proposed a number of regulatory changes 27 that would affect the organizational design that many existing NPHC's have incorporated.
The regulations are intended to minimize the possible influence that a corporate member might have on the activities of the corporation, its board of directors, or employees that involve the practice of medicine. Since one of the principal uses of a NPHC is the employment of physicians, 28 those regulatory changes that relate to this purpose are outlined as follows: 29 1. The "full-time" practice of medicine which is a requirement for an individual to serve as a member of the governing board is expanded to include those activities dealing with professional, managerial, administrative, or supervisory activities related to the practice of medicine or delivery of health care services. 2. The physicians who serve as the initial incorporators for purposes of becoming a non-profit corporation would have the right to select the initial governing board members. 3 ' 3. Appointment of governing board members after the initial governing board by the "corporate member" must receive approval by a majority of the physician governing board.
32
4. Activities of the corporation that involve credentialing, quality assurance, utilization review, and peer review are the exclusive domain of the physician governing board; financial matters can be limited to the discretion of the corporate member. 5. Any decision to terminate a physician's employment contract with the NPHC must be approved by the physician governing board and would be subject to any "due process" requirements adopted by the governing board4 6. A physician governing board member can be removed by the "corporate member" only "for cause" as stated in the NPHC bylaws; "for cause" can not involve matters relating to credentialing, quality assurance, utilization review, peer review, or the practice of medicine.
3 5
7. The "corporate member" can not unilaterally amend the NPHC bylaws and must receive a majority approval from the physician governing board.
36
8. Annual reporting requires submission of various types of information including financial relationships between the physician board members and the "corporate member" of the NPHC. 9. The TSBME is authorized to withhold or revoke a NPHC's certification if the NPHC does not meet the requirements of section 5.01a of the Medical Practice Act.
38
These proposed rules will be subject to public comment during the spring of 1995, when the TSBME expects to take final action.
C. REIMBURSEMENT In a transaction between two corporate entities in which the acquiring entity assumed no liabilities in the purchase according to state law, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in United States v. Vernon Home Health, Inc. held that federal regulations could impose liability on the acquiring entity. 39 In this transaction, the acquiring entity accepted transfer of the selling entity's Medicare provider number. In the course of a periodic audit review it was determined that the selling entity had been overpaid by the Medicare program during the operation of home health agency by the seller. Even though the liability for repayment would have been di-31. Id rected to the seller, state law was preempted by federal Medicare regulations. 40 Thus, the acquiring entity was held to be liable for repayment. Legislation passed in 1993 prohibiting the release of information on patients involved in auto accidents 43 was ruled unconstitutional in Moore v. Morales." In the same decision, Judge Hittner also struck down a similar piece of new legislation 4 5 which limited the release of auto accident information for 180 days from the date of the accident. 46 The laws were intended to protect accident injured individuals from solicitation by lawyers and other individuals during a time of distress. 47 The lawsuit was initiated by businesses that review information maintained by public agencies responsible for accident and criminal offense monitoring. 48 The businesses claimed that their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights under the United States Constitution were violated by the legislation. 49 The court ruled that the legislation exceeded limitations on commercial speech approved by the United States Supreme Court. 50 The court also determined that the purpose of the legislation in preventing deceptive or misleading communications was not served by imposing time limits.
51
The court further held that privacy rights of individuals were not protected by the new legislation since the information subject to the new state laws was available through other public means including insurance companies. [V¢ol. 48 adult had appointed an agent under a Durable Power of Attorney for Health Care, 54 or other specific circumstances were applicable such as an emergency where consent is implied 55 or the patient met the requirements of the Natural Death Act.
5 6 In spite of this situation, many consent forms were signed by next of kin, which gave the health care providers involved in rendering care some sense of believing they were protected. Although technically, no valid consent existed by these next of kin consents, the providers were acting on the belief that the next of kin were acting in the best interests of the patient and expressing the wishes of the patient. These provisions clarify who and under what circumstances decisions can be made for patients who are not competent. 
1995]
3. Alternate Decision Makers:
If the requirements of the Act are met, and no exception is applicable, the Act then lists in order of priority those individuals who may make decisions based upon the patient's wishes, if known: 64 A. the patient's spouse; B. the patient's adult child who has the waiver and consent of all other qualified adult children of the patient to act as the sole decisionmaker; C. a majority of the patient's reasonably available adult children; D. the patient's parents; or E. the individual clearly identified to act for the patient by the patient before the patient became incapacitated, the patient's nearest living relative, or a member of the clergy.
4. Physician Requirements.
65
A. The patient's competency and medical condition must be described in the medical record. B. Reasonable efforts to contact the alternate decision makers must be documented in the record. C. Documentation of the consent obtained from the alternate decisionmakers should be executed on appropriate consent forms. If the foregoing requirements are met and all decisions are made in good faith, the health care providers involved in the care rendered are immune from civil or criminal liability with respect to consent issues. 66 
B. AGE OF CONSENT FOR BLOOD DONATION
The age of consent for blood donation has been lowered from eighteen years to seventeen years of age. 6 7 A blood bank, however, may not pay a person younger than eighteen years of age for a donation of blood or blood components.
C.
LIMITATION ON POWERS OF GUARDIAN
The Texas Probate Code was amended in 1993, revising substantially the provisions dealing with guardianship. 68 The provision conferring authority on the guardian to make health care decisions is broad, including medical, psychiatric, and surgical treatment other than in-patient psychiatric care. 
D. SURROGATE DECISIONMAKERS FOR RESIDENTS OF MENTAL
HEALTH FACILITIES
Amendments to the Health and Safety Code provide for a process to appoint a surrogate health care decisionmaker for residents of an intermediate care facility serving the mentally retarded. 70 An appointment can be made after an assessment of a resident indicates that the resident is not capable of making treatment decisions. 71 
Decisionmakers
The following priority lists those who can serve as surrogate decisionmakers: (1) an actively involved spouse, (2) an actively involved adult child who has the waiver and consent of all other actively involved children, (3) an actively involved parent or stepparent, (4) an actively involved adult sibling who has the waiver and consent of all other actively involved adult siblings, and (5) an actively involved adult relative who has the waiver and consent of all other actively involved adult relatives.
72
When there is no surrogate available or willing to serve in this capacity, a surrogate consent committee which is subject to specific membership qualifications and limitations can be established to make treatment decisions. 
Circumstances When Surrogates Decide
A surrogate may exercise decision making authority when the resident requires major medical or dental treatment that has a significant recovery period, presents a significant risk, employs a general anesthetic, or involves a significant invasion of bodily integrity requiring extraction of bodily fluids or an incision, or that produces substantial pain, discomfort, or debilitation. 
Limitations on Decisionmaking
The surrogate may not make health care decisions involving: (1) experimental research, (2) abortion, (3) sterilization, or (4) peals. 77 Dr. Gonzalez's practice was essentially eliminated at the hospital since he was not associated with the physician who obtained the exclusive contract for anesthesiology services. In the suit he claimed that contract rights were breached, business relations were tortiously damaged, and restraint of trade was involved in the exclusive arrangement. 78 While the court's opinion on the restraint of trade claim applied existing precedent from the Jefferson Parish 79 case, 80 the court did create new implications in the breach of contract issue 8 ' and affirmed the hospital's course of action for those matters claimed to involve tortious interference. 82 A. BREACH OF CONTRACT Dr. Gonzalez claimed that the hospital's governing bylaws which established a procedure for hearing and appeal were breached when he was effectively denied the right to practice at the hospital without such a hearing. The hospital contended that the case was controlled by Weary v.
Baylor University Hospital 3 and its progeny, which held that medical staff bylaws did not create contractual rights. The Gonzalez court, however, made the distinction between medical staff bylaws and hospital governing board bylaws in holding the hospital governing board bylaws did create such rights. 8 4 It did note that these "contract rights" did not guarantee work for any physician nor did they limit the hospital's right to conduct business including exclusive contracting. 8 5
The court also considered the basis for which hearings and appeals were made available and decided that since neither professional competence nor ethical conduct were at issue, there was no reason for Dr. Gonzalez to be afforded a hearing. 86 It determined that his privileges and membership at the hospital continued in place and that his ability to obtain work which had been affected was not the basis for a hearing. 87 B. TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE The court reviewed the exclusive contract and determined that it was a reasonable exercise of the board's power to provide proper management of the hospital. 88 The court also found persuasive the commonly cited arguments for entering into an exclusive arrangement for hospital-based physician services such as simplification of administrating the anesthesiol- 
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8 9
C. RESTRAINT OF TRADE
In following the Jefferson Parish 90 case, the court determined that the impact on the market place rather than the impact on the ability of the physician to practice was the issue to be resolved. 91 Since Gonzalez presented no evidence of adverse effects on the availability of anesthesiology services to patients in the market place it found that there was no valid antitrust injury.
VI. EMPLOYMENT A. DISCRIMINATION
The federal district court in Johnson v. El Paso Pathology Group, P.A. 9 3 found that a pathologist who was employed by an independent group of pathologists, and who also served as the hospital's medical director of the pathology department, could be considered an employee of the hospital as well as an employee of the pathology group. 9 4 Since Dr. Johnson was considered to be subject to joint employers, claims raised by Dr. Johnson of sexual discrimination against the hospital served as the basis for the hospital's liability.
The specific claims involved a hostile work environment, and her termination for refusing to accept a less desirable position than medical director. The determination that the hospital and group should be considered "joint employers" derived from the relationship between the hospital and group. 95 Considerable control by the hospital over the group existed both in the day to day operations of the pathology lab and in explicit contract language in a services agreement between them.
96
Among the various control factors that the hospital could exert over the group included the right to approve who the group hired and fired, the appointment of the hospital as the sole agent for numerous business matters including management and administration of the group's business affairs, and the right to approve the group's obligations exceeding $1000. gether allowed the court to determine that both the group and the hospital could be considered joint employers for any member of the group. 99 B. EMPLOYEE LEASING Legislation passed in 1993 requires the licensing and regulation of entities that engage in staff leasing. 100 This legislation permits a degree of dual control over the leased employee between the leasing company, often referred to as the "licensee," and the individual or entity which utilizes the benefit of the employee, often referred to as the "client." '' 1 This is of particular significance in the health care field since many of these "employees" hold a license that requires some supervision by the client. Application of this arrangement could involve physicians employed by a non-profit health corporation, 0 2 physician assistants employed by someone other than a physician, 10 3 or nursing or administrative staff provided to a physician's office by another entity such as a hospital. The licensee retains such rights as hiring, firing, disciplining, reassignment, employment, and safety policies. 1°4 For many purposes the dual control permits the client to retain supervision over the employee for those matters that relate to the employee's professional licensure.
There are, however, some areas of overlap that could be problematic. As an example, a physician assistant is supervised by a physician in the provision of health care services. When those services involve matters related to OSHA Bloodborne Pathogen Standards, the licensee's right to control safety policies could permit it to exercise control. 
C. EMPLOYMENT OF LICENSED INDIVIDUALS
Employment of Physician Assistants
Legislation passed in 1993 created a separate licensing authority for physician assistants who were previously only authorized to act by the Medical Practice Act.' 0 6 This new legislation does not restrict who may serve as an employer of a physician assistant -employers of physician assistants had previously been limited only to physicians.' 0 7 There is the requirement, however, that if an individual or entity such as a health care facility employs a physician assistant, an arrangement must be made in which the physician assistant has a supervising physician. 
Employment of Physicians
Legislation passed in 1993 permits a non-profit hospital or clinic or an organization that provides care to indigents to contract with a physician for medical services.' 0 9 The entity may guarantee a salary to the physician, bill, collect, and retain the collections up to the amount of the salary and a reasonable amount related to collection services. 1 0
D. EMPLOYMENT RELATED LIABILITIES
Facilities that employ mental health, chemical dependency, or rehabilitative care workers have a duty to inquire about the past history of any individual in their employment or being considered for employment regarding the individual's conduct that might be illegal, unprofessional, or unethical and that relates to the operation of the facility."' Specific liability is imposed in the area of sexual exploitation both for an employer's failure to inquire or for a former employer's failure to disclose information about a former employee's conduct. 1 2 The information to be disclosed may date as far back as five years from the occurrence of the sexual exploitation."
Legislation first enacted in 1991 dealt with the issue of the flow of benefits to or from a provider of health care services to another who was in a position to influence the referral of patients needing services. 1 4 Commonly referred to as the "Illegal Remuneration Statute," 1 5 it was the basis for a wide sweeping investigation of psychiatric facilities by state and federal agents. The results of these investigations intensified interest in the area and yielded a number of amendments to this statute and to other sections of the Health and Safety Code (Code) involving operation of mental health, chemical dependency, and rehabilitation service facilities. The subsections that follow will address changes and new additions to the Code and a summary of the litigation involving the Texas Attorney General and various providers.
Amendments to the Illegal Remuneration Statute
The 1993 amendments" 6 expanded the scope of coverage of the Act by defining a "person" as anyone who pays or accepts a benefit from a per- son licensed by a health care agency. 117 It also created a rebuttable presumption that a violation had occurred if: (1) a person had referred or accepted a referral of a person to an inpatient mental health or chemical dependency treatment facility, (2) a payment for outpatient services after discharge of the patient was made to the person making the referral, and (3) the payment was not returned if the services were not provided.
118
The amendments also created an exemption for entities that qualified as a health care information service. 119 The fifteen-part test requires various disclosures including any relationship between the health care information service and a health care provider or facility.
B. MENTAL HEALTH, CHEMICAL DEPENDENCY AND REHABILITATIVE SERVICES
Legislation
In addition to the illegal remuneration legislative amendments cited above that apply to all regulated providers, specific legislation was passed that applies primarily to mental health, chemical dependency, and rehabilitative care providers.
The (Vernon Supp. 1995) . The 15-part test involves numerous specific requirements for a health care information service (Service) to qualify for exemption. The Service must be offered by telephone without charge to the person calling. The Service may not initiate calls to prospective consumers and must not be influenced by a health care provider to direct consumers to any particular provider. The Service is to provide information about possible health care providers based upon certain criteria such as location, specialization, costs, payment arrangements among other criteria. The names of providers must be given on a non-discriminatory basis. The criteria and any questions the Service may ask the caller can not be accomplished in a manner that directs the consumer to a particular provider. The Service must identify all providers that meet the criteria specified by the caller in the geographic area indicated. The Service must disclose any relationship between it and any health care providers. The Service must maintain a customer service system that handles complaints and that monitors customer satisfaction. The Service is prohibited from (1) offering health care counseling services, (2) providing transportation to or from a provider's office, (3) advertising only for specific health care problems or health care providers, (4) charging health care providers a fee based upon the volume or value of referrals made from the Service to the provider, (5) excluding any provider from participation in its Service based upon the provider's specialty, (6) excluding a participant for any reason other than the participant's ability to maintain licensure, malpractice insurance, documented consumer dissatisfaction with the provider, adverse determinations of a peer review committee relating to the provider's professional or ethical conduct or termination of the agreement between provider and the Service, and (7) disclosing information identifying a consumer unless the consumer has authorized its release or the release is made in connection with an appointment with a health care provider. 120. Id.
121. Id. § § 164 .001-.014.
122. Id. § 164.006.
2. solicitation of patients by a referral source without disclosing the existence of a relationship with a treatment facility, if any exists; 3. the placement of an individual from a treatment facility in a public or private school or'a state or local governmental entity if that individual is in a position to refer to the treatment facility (subject to specific permitted practices); 4. contracts for the referral of patients between a treatment facility and an intervention and assessment service unless that service is operated by the Texas Department of Mental Health and Mental Retardation, a county or regional medical society, a qualified mental health referral service (as defined in this section of the Code), or a non-profit organization involved with family violence, runaway children, or rape; 5. operation of an intervention and assessment service by a treatment facility unless the service discloses to each person contacting the service of the relationship; and 6. advertisements that directly or indirectly promise a cure or guarantee treatment results including unsubstantiated claims. For notes on the Illegal Remuneration Statute, see Part VII.A. above regarding the rebuttable presumption created when payments for referrals are made in connection with inpatient mental health services. 
Litigation
Armed with legislation passed in 1993, the Attorney General vigorously pursued business practices in the psychiatric health service field state-wide. Suits were filed against health care providers, marketing firms, and management companies, with most resulting in settlements with the state and agreements to discontinue the particular practices. Most of the practices that were challenged involved payments from a provider either directly to a referral source or indirectly to a subcontractor who in turn made such payments. These practices were clear violations of the Illegal Remuneration Statute. 124 Other practices that were challenged involved compensation arrangements, typically between a hospital and a company that operated or managed a mental health unit for the hospital, in which the amount paid was based upon the number of patients or patient days. Although there is disagreement in the legal community whether payment practices based upon the number of patients or patient days violates the Illegal Remuneration Statute, 25 In Texas v. BHC Richland Hospital Inc.,126 the hospital was charged with several violations related to marketing and referral practices. The Attorney General alleged that the hospital had hired a high school counselor to make referrals to the hospital in direct violation of the solicitation section of the Treatment Facilities Marketing and Admission Practices Act (Act). 127 The suit also contended that the management contract between the hospital and a firm hired to manage the hospital's psychiatric unit illegally compensated the firm based upon the number of patients maintained in the unit. 128 A further allegation claimed that the hospital's failure to disclose the marketing relationship misled patients in violation of the Act. 129 Although the settlement agreement did not contain any admission of wrongdoing by the hospital it did agree not to pay remuneration for securing referrals and to contract only with licensed mental health professionals. 130 Each of these requirements follow the illegal remuneration provisions of the Health and Safety Code. In Texas v. Greeson 132 the Attorney General alleged that Greeson's marketing practices, which secured patients for Heights Hospital, did not meet the requirements for operating a qualified mental health referral service. 133 The marketing scheme, which did not utilize a psychiatric evaluation, involved a toll-free telephone number that persons interested in weight control could call. The marketing interviewer would determine the person's insurance coverage and recommend inpatient hospitalization for their weight condition. The outcome of this litigation was not settled at the time of publication of this Article.
In [Vol. 48 tion (PPO), or some other network arrangement that includes payors and providers. These relations frequently are based upon some form of participation agreement between the payor and provider. These participation agreements may be with individual providers, groups of providers, or with organizations comprised of different types of providers (physicianhospital organizations (PHO). Because of the efficiencies of contracting with a number of providers, payors have increasingly turned to these groups for participation agreements. The agreements and membership in these groups are becoming a greater percentage of a provider's access to patients and revenue. These agreements and membership in the various organizations noted above do not, as a general rule, have elaborate "due process" protections for the providers in the event the provider is terminated ("deselected") or excluded from participation. Many of the agreements have "without cause" termination provisions that are exercisable by either party on relatively short notice. The cases discussed below represent initial efforts on the part of providers to develop some degree of legal precedent requiring due process.
In Texas Medical Association v. Aetna Life Insurance Co.,136 the Medical Association was representing members of its organization who had been "deselected" from a preferred provider panel. The Association argued that the deselection threatened quality and continuity of care for the patients served by these doctors. 137 The notices that Aetna sent to the doctors indicated that the decision was based on business considerations and did not reflect on the quality of care the doctors provided. The suit was eventually dismissed by the court. which involved deselection of doctors in a preferred provider panel. In addition to the quality of care arguments made by the plaintiffs in Aetna, 40 the plaintiffs contended that they were entitled to due process rights under the Texas Administrative Code, which required a showing of the evidence used for deselection, and opportunity to refute the evidence and to present their own. Prudential indicated that the decision was an exercise of "business judgment" and relied on the "without cause" termination provision of the agreement. The case has been removed to federal court and is pending. provided under health insurance policies. Kaiser had allegedly denied to policy holders that their policies covered emergency care when the policy provisions did cover such care. The suit also claimed that Kaiser practices "unreasonably denied coverage or unreasonably delayed payment" on emergency care claims.
Kaiser responded that the group of claims that were the basis of the suit involved situations where the care received by the insureds was not covered by the insurance policy. In this instance which is common to HMO coverage, the plan does not pay for care rendered by a provider who is not part of the Kaiser network or which had not been pre-approved, unless a bona fide emergency existed; Kaiser contended that the suit was based upon a group of claims in which the primary issue was whether or not an emergency condition existed.
C. INSURANCE FOR INDIVIDUALS AND SMALL EMPLOYERS
The 1993 Legislature enacted the Small Employer Health Insurance Availability Act, which provided for the development of health benefits plans for employers with three to fifty employees. 142 Three types of plans were authorized: (1) preventive and primary care which includes outpatient and limited inpatient care, (2) inpatient hospital coverage and limited outpatient coverage, and (3) standard benefits providing a range of services. 143 Employer requirements specify that seventy-five percent of the premium cost be paid by the employer and that at least ninety percent of the employees chose to be covered. 44 Insurance company requirements specify that small employers cannot be denied coverage due to claim experience, health status, or medical history. 145 The insurer also is limited in its ability to increase rates or adjust rates depending on the type of employer. 146 The legislation also provides for the formation of purchasing co-operatives, 147 requires that all health insurers utilize a uniform claim billing form, and requires that applications and policies be written in plain language.
148
D. DISCRIMINATION AGAINST OSTEOPATHIC HOSPITALS PROHIBITED
New provisions of the Insurance Code require that an HMO or a PPO permit an osteopathic hospital the opportunity to contract for services if it serves the area covered by the HMO and PPO and the cost for services is similar to other hospital providers. 
IX. LIABILITY DEVELOPMENTS A. EMERGENCY CARE
A provider's duty to render emergency health care is governed by several considerations. In the case of a licensed professional such as a physician, a duty exists if there is an existing patient-physician relationship. If no relationship exists, the physician may choose to enter into one on a "charity" basis as described below in the subsection dealing with the "Good Samaritan law"' 150 or the usual form noted above. If the physician elects to participate on a hospital's emergency "on-call" list then the physician has, in essence, agreed to enter into a patient-physician relationship with those individuals who present to a hospital emergency department.' 5 ' The type of relationship the physician or any other licensed professional chooses to pursue dictates what duties will be expected of the provider. The cases below represent recent interpretations of some of these duties.
In Pope v. St. John' 52 a physician who was on call at a hospital was held to have assumed a legal duty to exercise ordinary care in the diagnosis of a patient who had presented at the hospital's emergency room. 153 The physician had responded to a call from the emergency room physician and attempted to diagnose on the basis of information supplied over the telephone. 154 In remanding to the trial court, the appeals court was persuaded that fact issues existed regarding whether appropriate testing had not been part of the diagnosis.
155
In Hernandez v. Lukefahr 5 6 a physician was permitted to utilize the "Good Samaritan" statute 5 7 as a defense.' 58 The physician had responded to an emergency call for help while on the hospital premises.
59
The physician went to the emergency room to assist with a patient being resuscitated. 60 After no apparent success, the physician pronounced the patient dead.' 6 1 The patient subsequently showed some signs of life and was transferred to another hospital but died within a few days.' 62 The court determined that the physician fit within the requirements of the statute in that he (1) did not routinely provide care in the emergency room, (2) he did not expect to receive any compensation for the services 150. TEX provided, and (3) he was not shown to have been grossly negligent in his actions.
63
Another item of note is the "Good Samaritan" statute' 6 4 which was enacted to encourage both medical and non-medical persons to render aid in a medical emergency. The standard of care is lowered to relieve some degree of liability for the actions of a "Good Samaritan.' 65 The statute can be asserted as a defense if the individual rendering the aid does not receive compensation for the services rendered and has not acted with wanton or willful negligence. 166 Recent amendments clarify that the statute does not apply to certain individuals in the following circumstances: 67 (1) to the patient's admitting, attending, or treating physician, (2) to those personnel who routinely work in a hospital emergency room unless the person is in the emergency room area for reasons wholly unrelated to work (3) to those who would ordinarily be compensated for the care given in the particular situation, and (4) to a person whose negligent act or omission was a producing cause of the event.
B. HOSPITAL LIABILITY FOR PHYSICIAN ACTS In Berel v. HCA Health Services of Texas, Inc.
168 a summary judgment for the hospital was reversed holding that the hospital could be held liable for the acts of a staff member's practice of medicine. 69 Acknowledging the body of case law holding that a hospital was not responsible for the acts of a physician under a master-servant theory the court decided that the nature of the right to control the details of the work of the physician could serve as such a basis.' 70 The court found persuasive deposition testimony by the physician involved that control was exercised in the course of the hospital's quality assurance and utilization review committee activities. 17 ' According to the physician these committees and the hospital's medical director could override a physician's medical orders. 172 The court also examined language in the Mental Health Code 173 that requires a mental hospital to be "run by" a qualified physician who is held responsible for performing certain duties.' 74 The court viewed these statutory requirements as forming the basis for a nondelegable duty upon the hospital. 175 The deposition testimony and the statutory language, taken together, led the court to hold that there were fact issues to be considered at the trial court regarding the degree of control that would justify imposing liability on the hospital.
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This case and any subsequent litigation that relies on Berel as precedent may represent an opportunity for plaintiffs to expand the ways in which a hospital could be held responsible for acts of a physician. The Texas Mental Health Code 177 imposes various duties upon a hospital with respect to its medical staff but permits a delegation of those duties to medical staff units of self-governance. 178 Whether these delegated functions will serve as the basis for imputing control by a hospital over a physician may serve to reshape these self-governance functions. Plaintiffs may be afforded an expanded basis for claims if this becomes a trend. Hospitals likewise should monitor whether a trend begins with this case to react in an appropriate manner regarding these physician self-governance functions.
The issue of negligent credentialing was the principal cause of action in Lopez v. Central Plains Regional Hospital, 179 that was reversed on appeal. The appeals court affirmed most of the summary judgment issues in favor of the hospital in the related malpractice claim but found that fact issues remained regarding the negligent credentialing claim. 180 There was conflicting evidence presented regarding the thoroughness of the assessment by both sides regarding the competency of the physician in question.' 8 ' In assessing the physician's capabilities in obstetrics the hospital had followed its policies closely, however, the appeals court believed that the evidence regarding the thoroughness of the assessment was subject to various interpretations. 8 2 Although the hospital credentialing process did include obtaining letters of recommendation and evaluations from individuals who had worked with and supervised the applicant there remained the question whether the information allowed for a determination of "actual clinical competency.' 8 3 The information reviewed did not address this specific issue and did not appear to ask those responding to evaluation requests about competence in the area of obstetrics. 184 This case not only reinforces negligent credentialing as a recognized cause of action but indicates an increasing degree of scrutiny of the process and the protection that the general public expects from hospital credentialing processes. 
C.
LIMITATIONS ON LIABILITY
Application of Texas Torts Claim Act
In University of Texas Med. Branch at Galveston v. York, 18 5 the court held that a patient's medical record is not tangible personal property.
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This determination allows the medical branch to meet the requirements of the Texas Torts Claim Act' 8 7 which requires that "a condition or use of tangible personal or real property"' 8 8 be involved before a governmental entity can be held liable.
York's malpractice claim against the medical branch was based on alleged failure of hospital personnel to record information on the medical record that would have indicated the need for treatment. 189 In reversing an appeals court's affirmation of a trial court's finding of negligence, the Supreme Court of Texas held that while the paper of the medical record itself was tangible the information to be recorded was intangible. 19° The court further determined that there was no clear indication that the Legislature intended to impose governmental liability for the misuse of information. 19 '
HMO Not a "Provider" of Health Care
In Pickett v. CIGNA Healthplan of Texas,' 92 the appeals court upheld precedent that an HMO is not liable for the acts of a physician providing care if the HMO did not directly employ, supervise, or contract with the physician. 9 3 The plaintiff filed a medical malpractice suit against CIGNA claiming that it was liable for the negligence of the treating physicians as its agents and that CIGNA had "held itself out" as a practitioner of medicine. The treating physicians were employees of a medical group that had an agreement with CIGNA. Since the physicians were under the control of that group and not CIGNA, the court determined that there was not a sufficient degree of supervision to consider the individual physicians as agents of CIGNA.
194
The court also analyzed the claim in view of the Medical Liability and Insurance Improvement Act of Texas 195 (commonly referred to as the "Malpractice Statute") and determined that the statute did not apply to a health maintenance organization 19 2°° The release was required in connection with a federal civil service hearing involving a civil servant whose employment had been terminated. The court sought the medical records of the wife and son of the former employee who had allegedly attempted to murder both. The wife and son sought an injunction enjoining the production of the records. Even though a state court had entered a permanent injunction barring release of the medical records, 20 ' the proceeding was removed to federal court which determined that (1) the need for the medical records was pursuant to an authorized and proper investigation and (2) the documents sought were relevant to the investigation. B. TIME REQUIREMENTS Amendments to the Medical Practice Act require that a physician must release the medical records within thirty days of an appropriately authorized request. 203 Previous law remained intact which permits the physician to delete any part of the medical record that the physician believes would be harmful to the physical, mental, or emotional health of the patient. 204 The amendments require that the physician state the reasons for not releasing the information. 20 5 This confidentiality provision also allows the physician to delete confidential information about another person that may exist in the medical record. 20 6 The amendments also expanded the manner in which summaries of medical records can be prepared including microfilm, computer means, or optical scanning devices. 
C. HOSPITAL NOT REQUIRED TO PAY FOR COPY COSTS
In Wiggs v. Fort Worth Osteopathic Hospital, 20 7 the appeals court upheld the trial court's finding that a hospital was not responsible to bear the cost of copying a patient's medical record. The plaintiff, who was preparing to file a medical malpractice claim, brought a declaratory action against the hospital seeking production of the records without payment. The trial court ruled that the provisions of the Medical Liability and Insurance Improvement Act 20 8 were unambiguous and did not impose responsibility for costs of duplicating the records on the hospital.
XI. PATIENT'S RIGHTS
A. RIGHT TO TREATMENT Although In the Matter of Baby "K" 209 is merely persuasive authority, it may provide guidance for any hospital or other provider facing the issue of whether to provide treatment that it considers "futile." In this case, an infant was born with anencephaly, a congenital defect in which the cerebral cortex is absent or underdeveloped. 210 No treatment exists to cure, correct, or ameliorate the defect. The hospital sought to discontinue treatment over the mother's objections contending that any treatment would be futile. The court found that the infant enjoyed protection under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), 212 Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act (Rehab Act), 213 and the Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act (EMTLA).
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In the ADA analysis, the court reasoned that Section 302(a) prohibits a public accommodation, including a hospital, from discriminating against an individual with a disability. 215 The discrimination was the denial of the use of a ventilator for the anencephalic infant where other infants needing a ventilator would have been provided that service. 216 The court reasoned that the hospital's rationale would lead to discrimination against an entire class of disabled individuals (i.e., anencephalic babies). 217 On a similar basis, the court's application of the Rehabilitation Act determined that, if Baby K were "otherwise qualified" to receive the use of a ventilator other than for the fact of the anencephaly, then withholding ventilator Finally, the EMTLA requires that a hospital provide for "stabilizing" treatment which, in the case of Baby K, would include providing a ventilator.21 9 The court rejected the hospital's contention that an exemption should apply since the stabilizing treatment would be futile and inhumane. 220 This case represents one example of the many dilemmas facing health care providers, especially hospitals, in dealing with the issue of allocating limited resources.
B. MENTAL HEALTH CONSIDERATIONS
Patient Confidentiality
Legislation passed by the 1993 Legislature amending the Health and Safety Code creates a limited exception to the restriction on the release of medical record information from a mental health facility. 22 1 Unless a patient gives their attending physician contrary written instructions, 222 a treating physician may disclose the fact that the patient was, is, or is planning to be treated in a mental health facility. 22 3 The disclosure may only be made if it is believed to be in the patient's best interest and only to a law enforcement officer or the patient's legally authorized representative. 224 A legally authorized representative includes a parent or legal guardian, an agent under a durable power of attorney for health care, an attorney ad litem, or for a deceased patient a parent, spouse, adult, child, or personal representative. 
Patient Bill of Rights
That part of the Health and Safety Code dealing with mental health services was expanded by the Legislature to require that a "patient's bill of rights" be developed for use in facilities to protect the health, safety, and rights of a patient receiving voluntary or involuntary mental health, chemical dependency, or comprehensive medical rehabilitation services in an inpatient facility.
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A separate "Bill of Rights" was developed for adults, teenagers, and children. 227 The adult version is the most elaborately written and includes specific freedoms that relate to the environment in which the care 
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is provided. 228 In addition to basic constitutional rights, adults are assured that: (1) treatment will be provided in the least restrictive setting, (2) any limitation of their rights will be reviewed at least every seven days, (3) communication privacy is maintained, (4) visitation access is not restrictive, (5) limitation on access to outdoors will be reviewed at least every three days, (6) unnecessary searches will not be conducted, (7) the patient's access to their own medical records is available subject to medically necessary limitations, (8) the right to refuse treatment, including medication, is clear, (9) a treatment plan is developed, and (10) physical restraints must be specifically ordered by a physician. 229 For voluntarily admitted patients there is the right to leave the facility at any time unless a physician believes that emergency detention or court ordered services are necessary or if the patient is under the age of sixteen and the parent or guardian who agreed to the admission objects to the patient leaving.
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The teenager's version includes most of the same basic rights as in the adult version although in a much more abbreviated manner. 23 1 This version encourages communication with friends and family, requires that the patient be informed if any special observation is required, and requires explanation if physical restraint is used including the reason such restraint is required and when and why it will be removed.
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The children's version, "The Little Dinosaur Named Wilbur" is presented in coloring book format with large, easy to read text. 2 33 It is designed to assure the child that he or she will have access to their games and toys, be able to play with other children, visit with friends and family, be able to call or write letters, and have the treating staff explain treatments and the plan of care. 234 Supplementary materials to this version encourage the child to report things they do not like about the hospital to the hospital and their family.
Other Rights for In-patient Mental Health Services
The Health and Safety Code was amended at several provisions substantially expanding rights and protections to patients receiving in-patient mental health services. Among these expanded rights and protections are:
A. rights to information on medications 2 35 including identification of the drugs prescribed, conditions the medications are commonly D. access to a patient's own mental health record and an explanation if a professional denies access to any portion of the record 2 39 and E. right to refuse treatment unless another individual has authority to make treatment decisions and right to informed consent including benefits, risks and alternatives to the treatment being considered.
XII. PEER REVIEW AND RELATED ISSUES
A. PRIVILEGE OF CONFIDENTIALITY FOR PEER REVIEW AND MEDICAL
COMMITTEES
TWo statutory provisions govern the privilege of confidentiality of peer review proceedings. The Health and Safety Code as recently amended provides that the records and proceedings of a "medical committee" are confidential and not subject to court subpoena. 24 1 This protection is contingent upon the records and proceedings of the committee being used only in the proper exercise of committee function and that these are not records maintained in the ordinary course of business. 242 The other provision can be found in the Medical Practice Act 243 which provides that "records or determinations of or communications to a medical peer review committee are not subject to subpoena or discovery .... The court noted that the Health and Safety Code (Code) provision was narrower than the Medical Practice Act provision (MPA) since the MPA applied to all information related to the peer review committee whereas the Code provision related only to the records and proceedings. The court, in deciding whether to apply the broader MPA protection or the narrower Code provision, focused on the definition of a "medical peer review committee; '248 in particular its described function "to evaluate the quality of medical and health-care services or the competence of physicians. '249 It also reviewed the definition of "medical peer review" '250 and came to the conclusion that the privilege attaches to the review of physicians in the course of their practice at the hospital where the peer review committee functioned. 251 "The evaluation and review must relate to activities or occurrences at the hospital so that corrective or preventative measures may be taken."
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With these distinctions drawn, the court applied the protective privilege to peer review information for a physician already on staff but declined the privilege to information received in the course of a physician seeking membership to a hospital. 253 Therefore the information contained in letters of recommendation and evaluation forms completed by those responding to requests for information should not expect the privilege to apply.
B. PRIVILEGE FOR JCAHO REPORT
In Humana Hospital Corp. v. Spears-Petersen, 254 the San Antonio Court of Appeals determined that a hospital's Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations (JCAHO) survey report could be protected from discovery in a medical malpractice suit. 255 It held that the report was a product of a joint committee contemplated by the Health and Safety Code, 256 that the disclosure of information on a voluntary basis to JCAHO did not constitute a waiver of privilege, and that the reports reflected a deliberative process of the organization with the purpose of improving patient care. (HCQIA) 260 and the Texas Medical Practice Act (MPA), 26 1 the court determined that the hospital and its peer review participants had acted without malice and could be presumed to have met the requirements of HCQIA and the MPA. 262 Since the plaintiff presented no evidence to rebut the presumption, the immunities were applied by the court without a review of whether other requirements of HCQIA had been met. 263 
XIII. RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS OF PROFESSIONALLY LICENSED INDIVIDUALS
A. GENERAL The 1993 Legislature enacted the Health Professions Council Act 264 which, among other requirements, imposed upon all individuals licensed by a health licensing agency uniform rules governing advertising. 265 "Advertising that is false, misleading, or deceptive or that is not readily subject to verification is declared unlawful .... ,,266 Advertising of this nature will subject a licensed individual to revocation or denial of his or her license and permits an action to be instituted by the consumer protection division of the Attorney General's office. 267 The particular advertising activities proscribed include: 
Physician Requirements
Amendments to the Health and Safety Code that relate to the prescription of controlled substances require (1) that the prescribing physician indicate the intended use of the drug unless the physician believes it is not in the best interest of the patient, (2) the name, address, and telephone number of the physician's place of business, (3) the DEA registration number of the physician, and (4) the quantity prescribed in both word and numerical form. 
Complaint Procedures Related to Persons Licensed By the Texas State Board of Medical Examiners
Persons regulated by the Texas State Board of Medical Examiners (SBME) which includes physicians, physician assistants and acupuncturists must meet requirements which enable patients to submit complaints to the SBME. 279 These requirements involve the placement of notices in conspicuous places in the practitioners office, in the patient's statement, or in the registration form completed by the patient. 280 The notice must inform patients how and where to make a complaint. It must be written in English and Spanish. 
Regulation of Physician Assistants
The Physician Assistant Licensing Act (Act) 28 2 imposed new licensing requirements for physician assistants and established the Physician Assistant Advisory Council to advise the Texas State Board of Medical Examiners and to regulate the profession including all matters related to licenses. 283 In addition to the typical duties of a licensing board, the Act delineated the scope of practice of a physician assistant to include: 292 The Act permits the employment of physician assistants by entities other than physicians 293 but requires that the assistant be "supervised" by a physician and that the supervising physician share legal responsibility with the entity. A. reports required to be made must be written, signed, identify the nurse, indicate what corrective action was taken and recommend whether the Board of Nurse Examiners (Board) take formal disciplinary action; 296 and B. when an employer or contractor takes an action against a nurse that involves reportable conduct and is effective for more than seven days a report to the Board must be made. 297 Amendments to the Peer Review Act 298 change the composition of a professional nursing peer review committee to include three-fourths of its members as registered nurses, only permit registered nurses to vote, if possible have at least one nurse in the practice field of the subject nurse, afford at least minimum due process including notice of the hearing and an opportunity for rebuttal.
299
Additional statutes on specific areas were enacted in 1993 that relate to professional review activities involving nurses governed by the Board:
A. penalties and sanctions; 300 1. Pharmacists may administer medication under certain circumstances (1) when a licensed health care provider authorized to administer the medication is not available, (2) the failure to administer the medication could result in the interruption of a critical phase of drug therapy, (3) the pharmacist possesses the skill and education required to administer the medication, (4) the pharmacist notifies the health care provider responsible for the care of the patient, (5) the medication is not administered in the patient's residence unless a licensed nursing home or hospital, and (6) the pharmacist does not delegate this authority. B. either a disaster has occurred which prohibits the pharmacist from contacting the practitioner, or the pharmacist is unable to contact the practitioner after reasonable effort; 310 C. the quantity dispensed does not exceed a 72-hour supply; 311 D. the patient is informed that the dispensing is without authorization and that future refills will require authorization from the practitioner; 312 and E. the pharmacist informs the practitioner of the refill as soon as reasonably possible. 
XIV. RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF LICENSED FACILITIES
A. LICENSURE
Hospitals
A number of amendments in the Health and Safety Code (Code) relate to the licensing of hospitals by the Texas Department of Health. 3 14 These amendments became effective on September 1, 1993. Those of greatest general impact on the operations of hospitals are outlined below.
A. Emergency Orders. 315 The Health Commissioner is authorized to issue emergency orders against a hospital if the commissioner believes that a hospital is violating or about to violate Code provisions, rules, special license provisions, injunctions, or any other order of the Commissioner or enforcement procedure. 316 The Commissioner must notify a hospital prior to the issuance of such an order and afford the hospital an opportunity for a hearing. 3 17 The hearing must be held within 10 days of the hospital's receipt of the notice.
318
B. Administrative Penalties. 319 The Commissioner is authorized to assess administrative penalties against a hospital for violations of Code provisions, rules, special license provisions, Commissioner orders or enforcement procedures. 3 20 The penalties, which may be assessed up to $1000 for each day the violation occurs, 32 1 are subject to mitigating factors such as previous violations, seriousness of the violation, jeopardy to patient health, safety, or rights, good faith conduct of the hospital, and "other matters as justice may require. ' C. therapy to be provided by a multispecialty team that has at least eleven specified capabilities; 3 "4 and D. written treatment and continuing care plans must be developed by these multispecialty teams and provided to the patient and any designated representative. 
Home Health and Hospice Care
Legislation relating to home health and hospice care amended various provisions of the Code. 34 6 These amendments consolidate for licensing purposes home health services, hospice care, and personal care into a single license for a "home and community support services agency" license. 34 These regulations describe the responsibilities of hospitals and their staff to provide medical screening to individuals presenting at a hospital's emergency department, to stabilize their condition, and to transfer to another facility in an appropriate manner when necessary. Important aspects of the regulations including recent interpretations are outlined below.
Facilities Subject to Regulations 353
The requirement to screen, treat, and transfer applies to hospitals that offer emergency services. Those facilities that do not offer emergency services must have procedures to deal with patients needing emergency services if they present at such a facility.
When Services Must Be Rendered 354
In efforts to clarify when the regulations apply to a person's need for emergency medical care, this section defines that a person "comes to the emergency department" when the person is on the hospital property. Specifically excluded are patients in emergency medical transport vehicles who have contacted the hospital but have not been accepted for treatment unless the hospital owns or operates the transport vehicle involved.
Medical Screening and PersonneP
55
A medical screening must be performed on each individual who comes to the emergency department to determine whether an emergency exists and what treatment is necessary, if any, to stabilize the patient. The per-sonnel necessary to perform the screening must be "qualified medical personnel." Those physicians who serve on a facility's "on-call" list will define, in part, what the hospital's capabilities are for particular services.
Stabilizing Treatment 356
Those services, including laboratory and related functions, that are customarily available to patients at the hospital must be utilized to stabilize a patient.
Delay in Treatment 357
A hospital may not delay its screening or treatment of a patient in order to determine an individual's ability to pay for the services. If the hospital's routine registration process does not impede the patient's screening and potential stabilizing treatment it may include questions about the patient's ability to pay. 358 This process, if undertaken, must be administered in a uniform manner to all patients in the emergency room area. 
Conditions of Transfer 3 60
In the course of a transfer certain requirements must be met including necessary treatment during transfer, appropriate medical information, and acceptance by another hospital and physician for transfer purposes. It is not the transferring hospital's responsibility to provide transportation services but the particular needs of the patient must be determined by the transferring physician.
Z Specialized Capabilities of Accepting Facilities
361
A hospital that accepts a transfer must offer all of its routinely available services including those that are specialized such as burn units, shock-trauma units, neo-natal intensive care, or regional referral centers in rural areas. If a patient requires services beyond what a hospital has the capacity to offer it may decline the transfer. If the individual is a patient in a hospital outside of the United States it is not necessary for a hospital with specialized capabilities 362 to accept the patient. 362. Although there is no regulatory detail that expands the description of what constitutes "specialized capabilities" at least one region office of the Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA) has interpreted the phrase to mean any service that is available at the (7) person's identity seeking referral may not be disclosed; 371 (8) disclosure of relationship between service and those receiving referrals including fee payments and selection criteria; 372 (9) maintenance of records on disclosures; 3 73 (10) disclosure of tolls or fees to make inquiry to a referral. 374 B. Disclosures and Representations. 375 Specific information must be made available to a prospective patient prior to admission including (1) the estimated average daily charge for inpatient facility services (2) the fact that professional fees may be charged separately from facility fees, (3) the name of the possible attending professional and (4) a bill of rights. 376 Specific representations that may not be made include: 377 (1) misrepresentation about insurance coverage available to the patient and the amount for which the patient will be responsible; 378 (2) statements about involuntary commitment related to leaving against medical advice unless made by a physician; 37 9
(3) statements that the patient's insurance company may deny payment if the patient leaves against medical advice; 380 (4) recommendation of admission to a mental health facility without the evaluation by a licensed physician; 381 or (5) recommendation of admission to a chemical dependency facility without the evaluation of a mental health professional. A. Reports of Abuse, Neglect, or Unprofessional Conduct. Amendments to the Health and Safety Code require an employee, volunteer, or any other person associated with the operation of an inpatient mental health facility or unit that provides comprehensive medical rehabilitation services who believes that the mental or physical well being of a patient receiving chemical dependency, mental health, or rehabilitation services may or will be affected by abuse or neglect to report the information to the agency that licenses the facility. 396 If a health care professional believes that an employee or a facility has or will engage in the conduct described above, that person shall report the information to the facility's licensing agency. 397 An employer of an employee who has made a report may not take retaliatory action against that employee without subjecting the facility to injunctive relief and actual and exemplary damages. 398 Retaliation against an individual who is not an employee and who has made a report will subject the facility to injunctive relief and actual and exemplary damages including those based on mental anguish. 399 B. Sexual Exploitation. A mental health services provider is liable to a patient or former patient if the patient suffers physical, mental, or emotional injury resulting from sexual contact, sexual exploitation, or therapeutic deception from the provider. 40 0 A mental health services provider or employer has a duty to report if there is a reasonable cause to suspect sexual exploitation or a patient has alleged such not later than 30 days after the allegation or the reasonable cause became known to any mental health licensing agency or the county prosecuting attorney.
4 0 '
XV. TAX RELATED DEVELOPMENTS A. CHARITY CARE REQUIREMENTS OF NON-PROFIT HOSPITALS
Legislation passed in 1993402 defines the duties of a non-profit hospital to provide charity care to its community. The legislation requires the hospital to plan for the delivery of charity care through a budgeted process that includes the development of a community benefits plan and the public disclosure of the results of the plan in an annual report to the Texas Department of Health (TDH). 40 3 Failure to provide the charity care subjects the hospital to possible loss of exemption from ad valorem, franchise, and sales taxes.
Community Benefit Standards 4°4
The legislation provides for four alternative standards that a hospital may choose to meet to maintain its tax exempt status:
A. charity care including government-sponsored indigent care is provided at a level that meets the reasonable needs of the community, taking into account the hospital's available resources and the tax-exempt benefits that the hospital receives; 40 5 B. charity care including government-sponsored indigent care is provided in an amount equal to at least four percent of the hospital's net patient revenue; 4°6 C. charity care including government-sponsored indigent care is provided in an amount equal to at least one hundred percent of the hospital's tax-exempt benefits, excluding federal income tax; 40 7 or D. prior to January 1, 1996, charity care and community benefits equal to at least five percent of the hospital's net patient revenue. Of this combined amount, at least three percent of the hospital's net patient revenue must have been provided to charity and government-sponsored indigent care patients. 4 0 8 After December 31, 1995 the charity and government indigent care three percent standard increases to at least four percent. 
